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1. Introduction: 
A new role for Japan’s Self-Defence Forces 
 
1.1. The Self-Defence Forces come to the aid of Japan’s allies 
On 19 September 2015, the upper house of the Japanese Diet passed a package of laws that 
are meant to extend the scope of Japan’s security policies. The laws were already passed by 
the Diet’s lower house in July and provide a substantial elaboration of the way in which 
Japan’s pacifist constitution is currently interpreted. The further interpretation of the 
constitution heralds a new role for Japan’s armed forces. In particular, the legislative changes 
enable Japan to engage in ‘collective self-defense.’ This means that the country’s Self-Defence 
Forces (SDF) are now allowed to come to the aid of allies that are under attack—most notably 
the United States (US)—even if Japan is not directly attacked itself. This is quite a significant 
step in the long-standing bilateral security pact between Japan and the US, and one that 
marks a shift towards an alliance in which Japan can fulfil a bigger security role. The new 
legislation also makes it easier for the SDF to operate in more forceful roles in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).1 
Although the new security legislation and its envisioned novel roles for the SDF do not 
involve sweeping changes, they are still fiercely contested both domestically and abroad. Abe 
Shinzō, Japan’s prime minister, has long been a proponent of loosening the constitutional 
restrictions on the SDF, so that Japan can contribute more proactively to peace and security 
in an increasingly interdependent world. Similarly, the US has also welcomed the expanded 
role of the SDF and the greater responsibility that Japan is taking in both in their bilateral 
security alliance and outside of it.2 However, there are many people and groups that do not 
subscribe to these narratives. For instance, the new security laws were only passed after days 
of fractious wrangling in the Diet and vocal protest outside of it.3 Many people in Japan fear 
that the SDF might get caught up in conflicts of the US, and some academics and observers 
point out the unconstitutional nature of the new legislation.4 Japan’s neighbours have also 
                                                
1 For a discussion of the implications of the legislation for the Self-Defence Forces, see, for example: Rupakjyoti 
Borah, “Japan’s Controversial Security Bills Pass in the Upper House. Now What?” The Diplomat, 19 September 
2015. Accessed online. 
2 “Japan’s Security: Gloves Off,” The Economist, 11 July 2015, p. 44. 
3 “A new role for Japan’s Self-Defence Force: Abe’s Stain” The Economist, 26 September 2015, p. 46. 
4 Rupakjyoti Borah, “Japan’s Controversial Security Bills Pass in the Upper House;” The Economist, 11 July 2015, 
p. 44. 
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fiercely condemned the expansion of Japan’s security policies. China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs asserted that the new legislation undermined regional stability, and its state-run press 
agency, Xinhua, marked it as a return to Japanese militarism.5  These highly diverging 
narratives demonstrate the contested nature of Japan’s armed forces in discourse on Japanese 
security policy. All narratives portray different views on the legal status of the SDF, how its 
various branches should be organized and equipped, where it can be deployed and under 
what circumstances, and what the scope of its activities should be. 
 
1.2. The Self-Defence Forces and popular culture 
These narratives on the SDF are not only projected in governmental and media discourse. A 
domain that has become increasingly relevant as a site where issues related to security and the 
role of the armed forces are negotiated and contested in Japan is that of popular culture. On 
the one hand, Japan’s defence establishment has followed the lead of other government 
agencies in drawing on cultural codes and conventions in its communication with domestic 
and foreign audiences. On the other, representations of the SDF in works of popular culture 
have both appeared more frequently and become more complex in their messages. While the 
incremental changes in the roles of the SDF and the shifts in Japanese security policy and 
identity have been well studied by now,6 the interrelationships between popular culture and 
the SDF have hardly received scholarly attention. A notable exception to this is the work of 
Sabine Frühstück. She has examined how the Japanese military is striving to manipulate and 
align itself with popular culture in their public relations to shape their image.7 Frühstück also 
briefly considers the appearance of the SDF in works of popular culture, but this is not the 
main focus of her study. A number of other studies that do examine the contestation of politics 
in works of popular culture sometimes touch upon issues surrounding the SDF—themes such 
as nationalism, wartime history, and the security alliance with the US—but none of them 
centre on the narratives and images that are constructed around Japan’s contemporary armed 
                                                
5 “A new role for Japan’s Self-Defence Force: Abe’s Stain”  p. 46. 
6 Recent examples include: Glenn D. Hook, and Key-Yong Son, “Transposition in Japanese state identities: 
overseas troop dispatches and the emergence of a humanitarian power?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 
67, No. 1 (2013): 35-54; Arpita Mathur, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: Towards a Normal Military,” Strategic 
Analysis 31, No. 5 (2007): 725-754; and Oros, Andrew, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security 
Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
7 Sabine Frühstück and Eyal Ben-Ari, ““Now We Show It All!’ Normalization and the Management of Violence 
in Japan’s Armed Forces,” Journal of Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (2002); and Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: 
Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007): esp. pp. 116-
148. 
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forces specifically. I will discuss some of these studies more in depth later on. Examining how 
the SDF is represented in popular culture yields valuable insights of how Japanese society 
thinks about itself and its armed forces. 
 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
My thesis project builds on the work of the scholars that have examined the political content 
of works of popular culture in Japan. In particular, it attempts to analyze in more depth how 
images and narratives of the SDF are represented in cultural texts. The study focuses on 
contemporary Japanese comics (manga) as a pop-culture medium in which dominant 
understandings of security and the armed forces are negotiated and contested. Manga not 
only remains one of the most widely consumed media in Japan, but its nature as both a 
textual and graphic form give it compelling capabilities for communicating messages. As a 
case study, I have selected the manga adaptation of Yanai Takumi’s popular military fantasy 
series Gēto: jieitai kano chi nite, kaku tatakaeri.8 
The aim of my study was to find out how representations of the SDF in Gate convey 
particular understandings of Japan’s armed forces and its role in international security policy 
through narrative and graphic devices. I have conducted a politico-historically situated textual 
analysis to this end. In order to determine how the understandings conveyed in Gate relate to 
Japan’s new security legislation and its envisioned novel roles for the SDF, I have contrasted 
the manga’s narrative both with Japan’s extant security posture and other key compelling 
narratives for an alternate envisioning of the military in Japanese security discourse, which 
have already been mapped by earlier studies. In doing so, I was able to assess whether the 
narrative of the SDF in the manga is mirroring and legitimizing or deflecting and challenging 
Japan’s existing security posture and the role of the armed forces therein. 
The thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 situates the study in a theoretical framework 
and explicates how I conceptualize and operationalize the key concepts in my study by 
drawing on existing secondary literature. First, it considers the uncertain status of the armed 
forces in Japan, after which it identifies dominant narratives surrounding the SDF within the 
discourse on Japanese security policy. Second, the chapter will explain in more depth how 
popular culture has increasingly become an important site in which these narratives compete 
for dominance. In particular, I will focus on manga as a medium of political contestation. 
                                                
8 The title of the series can be loosely translated as Gate: Thus the Self-Defence Forces Fight in That Place. Hereafter, I 
will simply refer to the series as Gate. 
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Chapter 3 discusses my methodological framework by explaining the selection of my cases 
and sources and elaborates upon the research methods I have used in the textual analysis. My 
analysis of the primary source material is then presented in chapter 4. It explicates the 
narrative surrounding the SDF as it is conveyed in Gate, and how this narrative constructs a 
specific understanding of Japan’s security and the role of its armed forces. Finally, I will briefly 
consider how Gate supports or challenges the other main narratives in Japanese security 
discourse identified earlier and reflect upon the implications of the understanding that Gate 
constructs.  
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2. Theoretical framework:  
Contesting narratives of the Self-Defence Forces 
 
2.1. The uncertain status of Japan’s armed forces 
The legitimacy and role of the Self-Defence Forces lie at the heart of the current debate 
surrounding the Abe administration’s new security legislation and the imminent possibility of 
constitutional revision. In particular, the debate centres on what Frühstück aptly describes as 
the “central paradox of military-societal relations in Japan.”9 Essentially, this paradox has to 
do with how Japan’s armed forces relate to the Japanese constitution. Currently, Article 9 of 
the constitution stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,” it further reads, “land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of 
the state will not be recognized.”10 The very existence of Japan’s armed forces thus contradicts 
the constitution. In fact, the Self-Defence Forces not only have all the organizational features 
common to most modern armies (they have ground, sea, and air branches) but are also one 
one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world, equipped with sophisticated 
weaponry (bar nuclear weapons).11 Also, according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, the annual military expenditure of Japan ranks eighth in the world, having 
spent $40.9 billion on military spending in 2015 (although the spending has been capped at a 
maximum of 1 percent of GDP since the 1970s).12 Although Japan’s Self-Defence Forces are 
funded, organized, equipped, and trained to exercise a wide range of activities, one of these 
still remains a preparedness for combat and war.13 However, the armed forces are legally 
prohibited and normatively constrained in exercising their capacity for violence and are 
instead exclusively deployed for non-combat operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian 
assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The constitutionally ambiguous standing of the Self-
                                                
9 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 7. 
10 Wm. Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur Tiedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition, Vol. 2: 1600 to 2000, 
2nd Ed. (New York: Columbia University, 2005) p. 1032. 
11 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 8; Also see Japan 
Ministry of Defence. “Defense of Japan 2015” Official Website Ministry of Defense. 2015. Accessed online. 
12 Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman, “Trends in World Military 
Expenditure, 2015,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016, accessed online. 
13Japan Ministry of Defence. “Defense of Japan 2015”. See especially part III, chapter 1, “Building a Dynamic 
Joint Defense Force.” Accessed online. 
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Defence Forces and their restrictions on the use of force have given Japan’s armed forces an 
uncertain status, and Frühstück notes how service members have faced “a distinct lack of 
appreciation, and potentially hostile public opinion.”14 Although Japan analyst Richard J. 
Samuels has noted that the appreciation and public approval of the SDF improved 
significantly after their disaster relief operations in the aftermath of the March 2011 
earthquake and tsunami that hit the north-eastern part of Japan,15 their proper organization 
and the desired scope of their activities remains fiercely contested in the discourse on Japanese 
security policies. 
 
2.2. Competing narratives of the Self-Defence Forces 
Various actors within the discourse on Japanese security construct and project competing 
narratives of the status and roles of the Self-Defence Forces to change the discursive 
environment in which they operate to further their political objectives. In other words, they 
use narratives strategically. Political scientists are increasingly attentive to how this has 
implications for the contestation and legitimization of common understandings and policies. 
Scholars of political communication Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle 
examine how this works in relation to global order. They argue that strategic narratives are “a 
means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of 
international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.”16 A crucial 
part of strategic narratives, in their view, is that they “articulate end states and suggest how to 
get there.”17 What distinguishes narratives from the wider discourse is that narratives contain 
a strong sense of temporal movement that “orient audiences to a future.” Political elites and 
thought leaders draw on the prevailing understandings contained in a discourse and craft 
these into a “causal transformation that takes actors from one status quo to another”.18 
Narratives thus plot events in a sequence to provide commonsensical understandings. 
Miskimmon et al. argue that it is important to distinguish between three types of narratives, 
which they refer to as “system narratives”, “identity narratives”, and “issue narratives”, 
respectively. The first type of narrative conveys specific understandings about the nature of 
                                                
14 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 13. 
15 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013): esp. 
pp. 80-81. 
16 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New 
World Order (New York: Routledge, 2013): p. 2. 
17 Ibid., p. 5. 
18 Ibid., p. 7. 
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the structure in which actors find themselves; the second narrates how the character and 
behaviour of these actors are understood; and the third type of narrative constructs the issues 
that need to be addressed.19 These are key components to keep in mind when examining 
strategic narratives, but I disagree with Miskimmon et al. that these need to be conceptually 
considered as separate types of narratives. Instead, I argue that the boundaries between them 
are not that clear-cut and that these components are inherent to any narrative. 
The narratives that are crafted around the SDF also contain these components. Indeed, 
based on diverging understandings of the nature of Japan’s security in contemporary world 
politics, the identity of Japan’s armed forces, and what kind of issues they are confronted with, 
one can distinguish a number of competing narratives in the discourse on Japanese security. 
The work of Samuels is particularly helpful in considering these diverging understandings and 
the competing narratives that are based on them. Samuels has gone a long ways into mapping 
out the specific ideological positions various individuals and groups take up in discussions of 
Japanese security.20 In his study, he argues Japan’s security discourse is mostly centred around 
two issues: (1) whether or not it is acceptible for the SDF to use force, and (2) how close Japan 
and its military should cooperate with the US.21 Samuels has also considered narratives 
surrounding the SDF more specifically in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake and 
tsunami.22 He argues that, besides the narrative to “stay the course” that defends the status 
quo, there are two compelling narratives that construct alternative visions of Japan’s armed 
forces, which he refers to as the “putting it in gear” and the “back to the future” narratives.23 
These narratives largely agree with the competing visions of the SDF that Frühstück identifies 
in debates of the armed forces in her study. She finds that these visions and the discourse 
surrounding them, given the SDF’s unclear status, are permeated in particular by wrangling 
assumptions and persistent discussions of normality—what it means for a state and its military 
to be ‘normal’.24 In the next section, I will draw upon their work to single out the essential 
characteristics of these competing narratives of the SDF, guided by the three narrative 
components provided by Miskimmon et al. 
 
                                                
19 Ibid., p. 7. 
20 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2007): see esp. chapter 5, “The Discourse,” pp. 109-132. 
21 Ibid., p. 111. 
22 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, esp. pp. 80-88.   
23 Ibid., p. 82. 
24 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, esp. pp. 182 and 185. 
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2.3.1 The Self-Defence Forces as a ‘normal’ combat military 
The first narrative envisions an end to the unclear status of Japan’s armed forces by lifting its 
constitutional restrictions on the use of force and fully transforming it into a ‘normal’ combat 
military like most other states have. This narrative positions Japan in a very realist 
conceptualization of an anarchical world in which states remain fundamentally at odds with 
each other and often actively hostile. The main issue Japan then faces is a conventional 
military attack by its enemies. Samuels describes how proponents of this narrative suspiciously 
look towards a ‘rising’ China with which Japan has long-standing territorial disputes; Russia’s 
provocative anti-Japanese policies; and a belligerent North Korea that kidnaps Japanese 
citizens and doggedly pursues its development of  nuclear weapons.25 He argues that this 
narrative presents Japan as dependent on the United States. Because of “Japan’s 
infantilization” it is “dangerously unable to imagine war”.26 Japan’s fighters in the armed 
forces are considered “heroic”, Samuel finds, but due to their dependence on the United 
States and the constitutional restrictions on the use of force, the SDF are not properly 
equipped and cannot protect Japan’s citizens and territory. According to Frühstück, this 
narrative is permeated with a sense of ‘abnormality’. Its proponents feel that, due to the 
Japans restrictions on the use of force by their military, they are an anomaly in the 
international system and a deviation of global norms.27 Somehow, the SDF are not a “real 
military” and Japan not a “normal state”.28 Thus, Samuels concludes, the recommended 
course for the future for the advocates of this narrative is “to make the military more 
muscular, more capable and more independent of the United States.”29 Or, as Frühstück 
summarizes it: the SDF “should become a full-blown combat military.”30 The prime objective 
of Japan’s armed forces should then be to more effectively deter hostile action against Japan, 
and, in the worst case scenario, be ready to defend the state and its territorial waters and 
airspace—including the disputed Senkaku (or Diayu) islands. Frühstück explains how 
discussions of ‘normalizing’ Japan in this way were launched in great part by the conservative 
politician Ozawa Ichirō’s 1993 book Nihon kaizō keikaku (Blueprint for a New Japan),31 and 
                                                
25 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, pp. 83-84. 
26 Ibid., p. 83. 
27 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 181 and 186. 
28 Ibid., p. 182. 
29 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, p. 82. 
30 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 182. 
31 Ibid., p. 186. 
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Samuels singles out right-wing cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori and conservative national 
security scholar Nakanishi Terumasa as prominent advocates of this narrative.32 
 
2.3.2. The Self-Defence Forces as a global disaster relief force 
The second narrative proposes to fundamentally transform the SDF into a nonmilitary force 
specialized in disaster relief that can be deployed globally to assist countries in need. This 
narrative is undergirded with a more constructivist perspective towards the nature of the 
international system and seems to be determined to break free from conventional security 
dilemmas and arms build-ups that are the result of a more realist outlook on world politics. Its 
proponents also have a completely different conception of the main security issues that Japan 
is confronted with. According to Samuels, subscribers to this narrative argue that “natural 
disasters and nuclear power are greater threats than foreign states”.33 Frühstück also points 
out how advocates of this narrative note the more frequent occurrence of large-scale natural 
disasters. They argue that the successful deployment of the SDF in cases of humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, both domestically and abroad, illustrates that global security 
challenges in the twenty-first century are “much better handled by nonmilitary means”.34 
Samuels describes how, according to this narrative, the increasing experience and adept 
handling of such cases “points the way forward toward a more appropriate role for Japan in 
world affairs.”35 Japan should thus reaffirm the original antimilitarist nature of its post-war 
security identity and reorient the SDF from its current unclear status back into the 
nonmilitary organization that it was supposed to be. This reorientation should turn the SDF 
into a force specialized in disaster relief. Both Samuels and Frühstück single out Waseda 
University professor Mizushima Asaho as one of the chief proponents of this view. He 
proposes to reinvent the SDF as what he calls a global Disaster Relief Force (DRF).36 The 
main role of this force would shift from defending the state to protecting people. This would 
not be limited to Japan. Samuels describes how Mizushima and like-minded people argue that 
Japan can fulfil a leading role in providing its services to the rest of the world. This would also 
have a pacifying effect. Since Japan can no longer be perceived as a military security threat, 
no nation would have any reason to attack it, so the narrative goes. Japan would thus no 
                                                
32 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, p. 82. 
33 Ibid., p. 87. 
34 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 187. 
35 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, p. 87. 
36 bid.; Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 187. 
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longer be reliant on the security umbrella of the United States. This means that the funding of 
the US military presence in Japan can be transferred to equipping the newly established DRF 
with more advanced disaster response capabilities.37 Other proponents of this narrative 
besides Prof. Mizushima are, for example, Kawasaki Akira (activist of the non-governmental 
organization Peace Boat) and members of the Communist Party.38 In fact, Frühstück herself 
seems to support this narrative as well. She argues that Japan’s armed forces “have been 
hesitant and cautious pioneers among military establishments.”39 The missions that they have 
been entrusted with so far, she claims, encompass precisely the kinds of roles and activities 
other military establishments are increasingly moving towards as well. Frühstück supports the 
earlier judgement by Thomas U. Berger that, instead of being an international anomaly, 
Japan’s armed forces can be a “harbinger of attitudes to come.”40 
Thus, the ‘disaster relief force’ narrative envisions a more heartening future view of Japan’s 
security policies amidst increasing tensions in regional relations than the ‘normal combat 
military’ narrative does. For now, the Abe administration seems to be hedging its bets and 
steering a middle course between the two alternative visions of the SDF proposed by the 
narratives that challenge the status quo. The government holds on to the extant position of 
maintaining the constitutional restrictions on the use of force and continuing Japan’s security 
alliance with the US, while incrementally adapting their policies within the boundaries of 
acceptible discourse to evolve the activities of the SDF to react to new security challenges. 
This involves, for instance, deployment abroad for noncombat missions under the aegis of the 
United Nations. These gradual evolutions in policies and expansion of the activities of the 
SDF, however, still fit awkwardly with the constitution, and they remain contested. 
 
2.3. The Self-Defence Forces and popular culture 
A domain that has become increasingly relevant as a site where the contesting narratives of 
Japanese security and the role of the armed forces are projected is that of popular culture. 
Over the last two decades, in particular, the amount of cultural works that address the Self-
Defence Forces has gone up. Moreoever, the understandings of Japan’s military that are 
communicated through these works has become increasingly more complex.  
                                                
37 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, p. 87. 
38 Ibid., pp. 86-88. 
39 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 7. 
40 Ibid., p. 187. 
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Despite this recent proliferation, however, the unclear legal status of Japan’s armed forces 
and their contraints on combat have long inhibited popular attention for the SDF. This is not 
only the case for reportage by television stations and newspapers, but also for producers of 
popular culture. Frühstück briefly considers the appearance of the SDF in popular culture in 
her discussion of the defence establishment’s public relations campaigns. She explains that 
“most producers of popular culture in Japan have been wary of addressing the Self-Defense 
forces in their work. Whether in cinema, video games, animated films, or comics,” she finds, 
“glorifying representations of Japan’s military present have been conspicuously subdued in 
Japan’s popular culture.”41 One reason for this, she argues, is the pervasive anti-militarist 
sentiments in Japanese society that prevents cultural productions around the SDF to find an 
audience. Another reason is the trouble cultural producers seemed to have in constructing 
compelling plotlines around the armed forces. Frühstück quotes manga artist Matsumoto 
Reiji, in particular, who says that it is hard to feature the SDF in works of fiction because 
“their function is not quite clear”.42 It is due to what Frühstück even terms “a vacuum” of 
popular representation of the SDF that the army launched its public relations campaigns to 
actively shape their popular image.43 Her study demonstrated how the military has followed 
other government agencies in drawing on cultural codes and forms to communicate to various 
audiences, and her argument has resonated (albeit less refined) in a few recent articles as well, 
most notably by Jonathan Gad for Vice News and Matthew Brummer in The Diplomat.44 
Despite the long-standing hesitance on the part of cultural producers themselves to address 
the SDF, however, the number of works of popular culture that represent Japan’s 
contemporary military have steadily increased over the past two decades, and the contents of 
their messages have become more complex. A particularly notable example of cultural works 
addressing the SDF is the Sengoku Jieitai series. This body of works spanning across multiple 
media centres around a plotline in which members of a batallion of the GSDF are 
accidentally sent back in time through a ‘time slip’ to the Warring States period, where they 
become entangled in a struggle for the rule of Japan by competing feudal lords. The story is 
based on a 1974 novel by science-fiction and fantasy writer Hanmura Ryō. A manga 
adaptation illustrated by Tanabe Setsuo was serialized in the manga magazine Play Comics 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 117. 
42Ibid., p. 117. 
43 Ibid., p. 118. 
44 Jonathan Gad, “The Japanese Military is Getting Offensively Cute,” Vice News, 13 April 2015, accessed online; 
Matthew Brummer, “Japan: The Military Manga,” The Diplomat, 19 January 2016, accessed online. 
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between 1975 and 1976 and was continued for a sequel from 2000 onwards. In 1979, a 
feature film was released by Tōhō that was also distributed outside of Japan as G.I. Samurai. A 
remake of the original film was released in 2005 as Sengoku Jieitai 1549 (known outside of Japan 
as Samurai Commando: Mission 1549) and a manga of the same name was published by 
Kadokawa Shoten. The remake has also spawned a television miniseries that was aired by 
NTV in 2006. In the case of Sengoku Jietai, there are significant differences in the manner in 
which the SDF are displayed throughout the various installments in the franchise, and the 
messages conveyed through these works has become increasingly complex. 
The proliferating multi-media franchise that is sprouting around the work of Yanai’s Gate is 
a more recent example of the continuing proliferation of works addressing the SDF. The 
“vacuum” Frühstück identified is thus slowly being filled. As we will see, Gate represents the 
army in a sophisticated way and attempts to address a number of political issues through its 
contents. Its growing popularity and spin-off into multiple media indicates the work resonates 
with various audiences, which is indicative of shifting attitudes towards the SDF in Japanese 
society, and a willingness to accept more representations of the armed forces in popular 
culture. 
 
2.4. The politics of popular culture 
The stories that are presented in works of popular culture such as Sengoku Jieitai or Gate are not 
innocent fantasies. Novels, feature films, television series, pop songs, video games, comic 
books, etc. construct particular views of the world while closing off other imaginings. The 
communication of these views through popular culture contributes to the production and 
maintenance of common-sensical understandings that in turn shape how social and political 
life are constituted. This is but only one of the many conceptual approaches to popular 
culture, but it is one that is increasingly adopted by a wide range of scholars. Elisabeth 
Bronfen likens popular culture to a sort of collective imaginary. She argues that through works 
of popular culture “we make sense of the world by producing coherent narratives, which in 
turn serve as the basis for any sense of community and political action.”45 Stuart Hall argues it 
can be seen as a site where “collective social understandings are created”.46 Daniel Nexon and 
Iver Neumann argue that popular culture is “a crucial domain” in which “morality is shaped, 
identities are produced and transformed, and effective analogies and narratives are structured 
                                                
45 Elisabeth Bronfen, “Reality Check: Image Affects and Cultural Memory,” Differences 17, no. 1 (2006): p. 23. 
46 Stuart Hall (2009), quoted in John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction (London: Pearson 
Longman, 1994): p. 4. 
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and altered.”47 These scholars share the assumption that meaning is not something that is 
fixed and constant but socially constructed. Views of how we see the world and ourselves in it 
are thus contested and they change over time. Popular culture is one of the sites in which 
these contestations over meaning take place. 
An important implication of conceptualizing popular culture as a site in which collective 
understandings are shaped and contested is that this turns a realm of supposedly frivolous 
entertainment into a sphere of politics. If what we naturally consider to be political reality is 
actually socially constructed through representations in e.g. popular culture, then this bestows 
tremendous power on the practices and texts that represent certain norms and ideas since 
these effectively contribute to common understandings. How texts then struggle over 
competing meanings is what Hall refers to as the “politics of representation”.48  John Storey 
argues that “all texts are ultimately political” since “they offer competing ideological 
significations of the way the world is or should be.”49 Since works of popular culture thus 
represent diverging and competing views of the world, we can follow Jutta Weldes in arguing 
that popular culture can thus be seen as “composed of potentially contested codes and 
representations”, which “designates a field on which battles over meaning are fought.”50 
Bronfen even stresses that the “real political battles are fought … within the parameters of our 
collective cultural imaginary.”51 How these battles in the imaginary are fought out more 
concretely is explained well by Weldes. She argues that works of popular culture can either 
reinforce or challenge the extant political order and its power relations. Works that are 
supportive of the status quo reconfirm the views of government officials and facilitate public 
acceptance of government policies since these are aligned with common-sensical knowledge. 
However, works of popular culture can also challenge the status quo by providing “alternative 
visions of world politics [and] possibilities for transformation … [that] allow us to imagine 
how we might better organize and structure local and global politics.”52 
A compelling example of how collective understandings can be reproduced in cultural 
imaginations is Mark Fisher’s discussion of what he calls “capitalist realism”. He highlights 
                                                
47 Daniel H. Nexon, and Iver Neumann, Harry Potter and International Relations (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006): p. 6. 
48 Stuart Hall, Jessica Evans, and Sean Nixon, Representation (2nd Ed.) (Los Angeles etc.: SAGE. 2013): p. xxiv. 
49 John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, p. 4. 
50 Jutta Weldes, “Popular Culture, Science Fiction, and World Politcs,” in To Seek Out New Worlds: Science Fiction 
and World Politics, edited by Jutta Weldes (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 2003): p. 5. 
51 Elisabeth Bronfen, “Reality Check: Image Affects and Cultural Memory,” p. 23 
52 Jutta Weldes, “Popular Culture, Science Fiction, and World Politics,” pp. 7-8. 
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how even in the post-apocalyptic scenario of the science-fiction film Children of Men, its 
characters still display patterns of behaviour associated with capitalism. Fisher wryly notes 
how it reminds him of Fredric Jameson and Slajov Žižek’s phrase that “it is easier to imagine 
the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalim.”53 According to Fisher, the film 
demonstrates how hard it is to unthink common understandings. That is precisely wat he 
means with “capitalist realism”, he says. It refers to “the widespread sense that not only is 
capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible 
even to imagine a coherent alternative to it.”54 The same obstinate common understandings 
are noticeable in the case of security policy and what it means to be a ‘normal’ military. 
 
2.5. Manga as a medium of political contestation 
A particularly noteworthy medium of political culture that has long been used as a vehicle for 
vibrant social and political commentary is that of comics. Manga, as contemporary Japanese 
comics are called, is one of the most extensive forms of popular culture in Japan. Manga is 
widely read by a broad range of readers. However, it is primarily a medium, and as such, it 
encompasses a vast range of thematic material, including politics, security, and—
increasingly—the SDF. 
However, whether manga as a medium actually has the potential to criticize or impact 
social and political processes in Japan has been a topic of fierce scholarly discussion. In 
particular, these discussions focus on otaku subculture as a specific type of manga readership, 
how its members relate to Japanese society at large, paying attention especially to the concept 
of moe. Both otaku and moe are (and remain) contested concepts, and their meanings have 
shifted over time. An accurate definition of otaku is captured by Jonathan E. Abel and Kono 
Shion, who describe them as “those Japanese, usually males and generally between the ages of 
18 and 40, who fanatically consume, produce, and collect comic books (manga), animated films 
(anime), and other products related to these forms of popular visual culture and who participate 
in the production and sales of derivative fan merchandise.”55 A working definition for moe is 
provided by Patrick J. Galbraith, who describes it as “an affectionate response to fictional 
                                                
53 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Hants: Zero Books, 2009): p. 2. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Jonathan E. Abel and Kono Shion, “Translators’ Introduction,” in Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, written by 
Azuma Hiroki, and translated by Jonathan E. Abel and Kono Shion (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009): p. xv. 
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characters.”56 Important participants in the debate on otaku and moe are psychologist Saitō 
Tamaki and cultural critic Azuma Hiroki. Both share an open attitude towards the otaku 
phenomenon and propose critical analytical engagement with its social characteristics in a 
period when otaku still had negative connotations attached to it and, as Azuma notes, were 
mostly associated with anti-social youth who had lost touch with reality.57 However, Azuma 
and Saitō differ fundamentally in their views and assumptions. 
Azuma draws on the philosophical concept of the ‘postmodern’ in his work to claim that 
national identity in Japan has slowly disintegrated and splintered when the country’s society 
moved to mass-consumption from the 1970s onwards. In an interview with Galbraith, he 
explains how this fractured sense of identity means that Japanese people no longer buy into “a 
grand narrative that is shared by everyone and holds society together.”58 Instead, he argues 
that otaku, in particular, are not so much interested in the narratives that manga convey, but 
rather in the particular manifestations of moe that they contain, such as cat and bunny ears, 
lolitas, maid costumes, etc. He likens them to postmodern “database animals” that 
deconstruct works of culture to the elements they favour.59 This means that the political 
nature of the narratives in manga such as Gate, which, as we will see, contains some elements 
of moe and targets a readership that encompasses people considered to be otaku, will not have 
such a big impact as the aforementioned cultural theorists have proclaimed. Saitō takes a 
more sympathetic view, however. He draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis to argue that the 
otaku’s interest in elements of moe stem from sexual desire more than a rejection of grand 
narratives in a postmodern society.60 
Despite Azuma and Saitō’s divergent positions in the debate regarding otaku and moe in 
manga consumption, what they have in common is that both focus on the production and 
reception of the manga texts by a specific type of readership more than on the actual contents 
and potential ideological biases of cultural works. This is part of a broader trend in manga 
scholarship in Japan. In discussing the rise of manga studies after adult manga came to be 
                                                
56 Patrick W. Galbraith, The Moé Manifesto: An Insider’s Look at the Worlds of Manga, Anime, and Gaming (Tokyo: 
Tuttle, 2014): p. 5. 
57 Hiroki Azuma, Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, translated by Jonathan E. Abel and Kono Shion (Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009): p. 4. Also, see: Sharon Kinsella, Adult Manga: Culture and Power 
in Contemporary Japanese Society (Surrey: Routledge, 2000.): esp. chapter 4, “Amateur Manga Subculture and the 
Otaku Panic,” pp. 102-138. 
58 Patrick W. Galbraith, The Moé Manifesto: An Insider’s Look at the Worlds of Manga, Anime, and Gaming, pp. 170-177. 
59 Hiroki Azuma, Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals. 
60 Tamaki Saitō, Beautiful Fighting Girl, translated by Vincent J. Keith and Dawn Lawson. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
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seen as a serious aesthetic and informative medium in the 1990s, Sharon Kinsella points out 
how most scholars tended to focus on the nature of the medium in their analyses, while 
neglecting to connect their textual studies to broader developments in Japanese society, 
economy, and politics.61 This point is repeated more recently by Jacqueline Berndt, who 
describes contemporary manga studies in Japan as a “narrow circle … that chooses to avoid 
macropolitical claims.”62 She argues that the possibilities for sociopolitical impact and critique 
inherent in manga as a communicative and aesthetic medium are still often neglected by 
Japanese scholars.63 
Berndt herself does consider manga an appropriate medium for sociopolitical criticism. 
According to her, the triple disasters of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis that rocked 
Japan in 2011 have “raised not only the question of how to resist the status quo but also of 
how to picture an alternative future.”64 She argues that “manga may be expected to make 
important contributions in this regard” because of its nature as “a site of imaginary worlds 
rather than direct depictions of social reality”.65 Some scholars have made some valuable 
contributions to the examination of how manga’s potential as a site of imaginary worlds can 
facilitate the communication of political messages. Matthew Penney and Mizuno Hiromi have 
even studied how the fantasy genre enables alternate visions of the Japanese military.66 
However, both of them focus on competing narratives of wartime history and past military 
battles more than on engagements with contemporary understandings of Japan’s security and 
its armed forces. Their studies do pave the way in considering how fantastical settings 
facilitate the communication of political messages. Thus, let us consider how Gate constructs its 
narratives with regards to Japanese security and the armed forces by deploying the military in 
an imaginary world. 
 
 
                                                
61 Sharon Kinsella, Adult Manga: Culture and Power in Contemporary Japanese Society, p. 101. 
62 Jacqueline Berndt, “The Intercultural Challenge of the ‘Mangaesque’: Reorienting Manga Studies after 
3/11.” In Manga’s Cultural Crossroads, edited by Jacqueline Berndt and Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2013): p. 66. 
63 Ibid., esp. pp. 65-66. 
64 Ibid., p. 78. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Matthew Penney, “‘War Fantasy’ and Reality—‘War as Entertainment’ and Counter-narratives in Japanese 
Popular Culture,” Japanese Studies 27, No. 1 (2007): p. 35; Hiromi Mizuno, “When Pacifist Japan Fights: 
Historicizing Desires in Anime,” in Mechademia, Vol. 2: Networks of Desire, edited by Frenchy Lunning 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2007): p. 105. 
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3. Methodological framework: 
Textual analysis of manga as visual source material 
 
3.1. Selection of case study 
I have selected Yanai Takumi’s Gate as a case study because, first, it is a series that has been 
increasingly popular in Japan. The original online stories by Yanai have been published as 
light novels, which where then adopted into both a manga and anime television series, the 
latter of which has also seen release in North America. The original series has also spawned 
several spin-offs across all media. I have decided to focus on the manga adaptation because of 
its particular visual and stylistic characteristics. Second, the multimodal semi-fictional universe 
presented in Gate contains extensive and clear analogies to both the SDF and Japanese 
international security policy. It presents the SDF centre stage in a clash of interests between 
various domestic and international interest groups—including the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China. The fictional dimension of the series is interesting because it 
allows it to consider ‘what-if?’ scenarios whose moral implications are highly insightful. The 
final reason for the selection of Gate is that it is a recent series and, as such, engages with 
contemporary views and debates of security, political identity, and state policy—most notably 
surrounding Japan’s constitutional restrictions on its armed forces.  
 
3.2. Textual analysis of visual source material 
This thesis employed textual analysis as a research method to draw out the latent political 
content of the texts in order to make connections between them and tie them to the broader 
discourse. To reiterate, the aim of my analysis is to find out how representations of the SDF in 
Gate convey particular understandings of Japan’s armed forces and its role in international 
security policy. In my theoretical framework, I have established how narratives are an 
intuitive and compelling form of representation. Based on the work of Miskimmon et al., I 
have set out three crucial components that are crucial to determining the security narrative 
around the SDF: system, issues, and identity. Thus, my driving questions are: what is the 
nature of the system in which the SDF operates, what are the key issues it faces, and how does 
it behave to solve these issues?  
In order to conduct the “close analysis of texts for detailed analysis of meaning” that my 
research question calls for, I follow the advice of Jane Stokes in using semiotics as a qualitative 
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set of research methods to to study the patterns of signification in the manga to be able to 
break down the ideas and conceptualizations that are captured in the visual images and relate 
them to the broader discourse on Japanese security and the role of its armed forces.67 Since 
the scope of my research project as a research project for a MA thesis was limited, I chose to 
rely on secondary literature to map out the discourse instead of doing a full discourse analysis 
myself. This is also due to the fact that the eight volumes of Gate that were published when I 
started my research already consisted a significant amount of textual primary source material 
to translate and analyze. The series is still ongoing, but the main political value of its plot and 
narrative is firmly established within these volumes, and I suspect that, due to its popularity, 
the series will keep its plot open and continue serialization for a while. 
I have focused my attention mostly on the site of the text itself, while leaving aside the sites 
of the production and reception of texts. In this, I respond to Berndt’s proposed research 
agenda of paying more attention to the sociocritical potential of manga instead of solely 
examining it for its manner of consumption and production. However, I will keep in mind 
manga’s specific form in examining its representational content. This means I have kept in 
mind how manga relies on its own aesthetic preferences and how the visual language used in 
Japanese comics employs different signs and techniques to convey meaning than those in, for 
example, Europe or North America—as Neil Cohn has stressed. 68  Since manga is a 
multimodal medium that not only relies on visual images but also text to convey its meaning, I 
have also followed the insistence by Toni Johnson-Woods to pay close attention on the use of 
language in manga, as the use of honorifics in the Japanese, for example, can provide “subtle 
clues as to the relationships between the characters.”69 Besides the focus on the multimodal 
nature of manga and the cultural specificity of the codes with which it signifies meaning, I 
have considered how genre conventions and targeted audiences might inhibit or facilitate the 
signification of meaning by the manga. 
Finally, to situate my text in its political and historical context, I have emulated Mizuno’s 
recommendation to treat the manga “as a historical text that needs to be contextualized yet 
embodies context within itself.”70 In other words, Gate needs to be considered in its context, 
                                                
67 Jane Stokes, How to Do Media and Cultural Studies (London: Sage, 2013): p. 119 
68 Neil Cohn, “Japanese Visual Language,” in The Visual Language of Comics: Introduction to the Structure and Cognition 
of Sequential Images (London: Bloomsbury, 2013): pp. 153-171; Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1993): pp. 77-82. 
69 Tony Johnson-Woods, “Introduction,” in Manga: An Anthology of Global and Cultural Perspectives, edited by Toni 
Johnson-Woods (New York: Continuum, 2010): p. 7. 
70 Mizuno Hiromi, “When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desires in Anime,” p. 104. 
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but it also reflects that context itself. In this case, Yanai wrote the main part of the original 
content of the franchise between 2004 and 2010, and as a result the series clearly reflects 
events and attitudes from the period in which Koizumi Junichirō still held office. However, 
the increasing popularity of the series and especially its spin-offs into a growing amount of 
other media during Abe’s incumbence suggests that the issues addressed in the series still 
resonates strongly within the current discourse on Japan’s security and the role of its armed 
forces. 
The next chapter will present the findings of the analysis. I will first briefly consider the 
production context of the original work, after which I will describe its main plot and genre. 
The subsequent sub-chapters will, in order, present the components that together constitute 
the security narrative that Gate as a manga series constructs around the SDF. 
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4. Analysis:  
Japan’s Self-Defence Forces fight in Yanai’s Gate 
 
4.1. Yanai Takumi’s Gēto: jieitai kano chi nite, kaku tatakaeri 
Gate is a multimedia franchise revolving around a story that centres on the deployment of 
Japan’s Self-Defence Forces in a fantasy world that mirrors our own. It can thus be considered 
as belonging to the genre of military fantasy. The original content of the franchise was written 
by Yanai Takumi, who himself is a former member of the Ground Self-Defence Forces 
(GSDF). After his period in the armed forces, Yanai studied professional writing while 
working as a medical social worker and later founding his own company. In between April 
2004 and June 2010, he published Gate in the form of a series of web novels on the user-
generated content website of Arcadia. Yanai’s web novels were first published in print by 
Alphapolis in April 2010. He has since also written a range of other original works, which 
were published by Kōdansha.71 The manga adaptation of Yanai’s novels are illustrated by 
graphic artist Sao Satoru. The manga is serialized montly on the Alphapolis’ website, and the 
first tankōban (collected volume) was published in June 2012. The Alphapolis website states that 
the manga is targeted towards a general male readership (ippan dansei muke).72 Gate has proven 
to be quite a popular series. In the Amazon.co.jp manga sales ranking for July 2016, the 
newest tankōban (volume 9) ranked 33 in the top 100,73 and the franchise as a whole has now 
sold more than four millions copies.74 The manga adaptation has also spawned an anime tv 
serialization that premiered in July 2015, which has been licensed by Sentai Filmworks for 
distribution in North America.75 Both the light novels and the manga and anime adaptations 
are still ongoing. 
Due to Yanai’s background as a former member of the armed forces and the central 
position of the SDF in Gate’s plotline, the franchise has recently been hailed as an example of 
how collaboration between Japan’s creative industries and the military has become more 
pervasive. In his article for The Diplomat, Brummer even claims that the manga adaptation of 
                                                
71 Japan Self-Defence Force Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Office, “Gensakusha—Yanai Takumi-san kara [A word 
from author Yanai Takumi],” accessed online. 
72 http://www.alphapolis.co.jp/manga/viewOpening/138000030/ 
73 Amazon Komikku Rankingu, 5 July 2016, online, cited 5 July 2016, available from 
https://www.amazon.co.jp/ gp/bestsellers/books/2278488051#2. 
74 http://www.alphapolis.co.jp/manga/viewOpening/138000030/ 
75 http://www.sentaifilmworks.com/news/sentai-filmworks-licenses-gate 
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Gate is “[p]roduced, designed, and funded in coordination with the JSDF”.76 This, however, is 
a gross overstatement. It is true that Yanai wrote the novels partly based on his experiences in 
the armed forces, and he said that he modeled some of the characters after people he actually 
knew during his time in the armed forces.77 It is also true that the series at some point 
collaborated with the SDF. When the tv anime series of Gate started to air in July 2015, the 
Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Office (TPCO) of the SDF made use of Gate imagery in two of 
their recruitment posters.78 It makes sense for the SDF to capitalize on the fact that one of 
their former members portrays the military prominantly and engagingly in works of popular 
culture, especially given the growing popularity of Gate as a multimedia franchise. However, I 
could not find any other evidence for any other links or collaborations between the armed 
forces and the production, designing or funding of Gate. I have tried to contact Brummer via 
multiple communication channels to ask where he found evidence to support his claim but 
have received no answer. Moreover, I find his (admittedly brief) discussion of the content of 
Gate superficial, and it seems Brummer is too quick to interpret Gate as simply another 
example of how Japanese society is being ‘militarized’ through its popular culture. He does 
not make an effort to probe the complexity with which Gate is trying to engage issues with 
regards to the status of the SDF and the way the military relates to Japanese society. Brummer 
even misreads a key part of Gate’s central message. Therefore, let us move on to consider how 
Gate presents its narrative on Japan’s security and its armed forces. 
 
4.2. Plot: The Self-Defence Forces are deployed beyond the gate 
The narrative of Gate is launched when a mysterious gate appears in the Ginza discrict in 
central Tokyo, from which an army of monsters and human soldiers flood that invade and 
attempt to capture the city. Japan’s military is quickly mobilized to assist the local police 
forces, who repel the invaders. Japanese Prime Minister Hōjō (clearly resembling former 
prime minister Koizumi Junichirō—see fig. 1) resolutely proclaims that, since the gate 
appeared in Tokyo, whatever territory lies behind can be considered a part of Japan’s 
domestic territory (nihon kokunai). He proclaims that whatever powers reside in what he refers 
to as the special region (tokubetsu chiiki), they need to be brought to the negotiation table, by 
                                                
76 Brummer, Matthew, “Japan: The Manga Military,” The Diplomat, 19 January 2016, accessed online. 
77 Japan Self-Defence Force Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Office, “Gensakusha—Yanai Takumi-san kara [A word 
from author Yanai Takumi],” accessed online. 
78 Japan Self-Defence Force Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Office, “Wadaibuttōchū! Terebi anime “gēto” to kiseki no 
korabo [Wonderful collaboration with tv anime Gate],” accessed online. 
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force if necessary. Thus, he states that the government of Japan deploys the SDF beyond the 
gate to investigate the special region, arrest the ones responsible for invading Ginza, and 
secure compensation for the incident.79 
       
The development of the plot is narrated in particular through the role 
of Gate’s protagonist, an otaku named Itami Yōji. He is a second 
lieutenant in the SDF, but he is introduced as someone who is in the 
military solely to support his hobbies and interests—manga, anime, 
and web novels in particular. Itami is off-duty and on his way to the 
well-known Comic Market (Komiketto) in Tokyo when the invasion takes 
place, but he resolutely acts based on his training, saving many lives. 
His performance earns him praise by Japan’s Minister of Defence, and 
he is appointed as leader of the 3rd reconnaissance squadron to scout 
the special region and gather intelligence (see fig. 2). 
 
It is not made clear as to how the gate appeared to form a passageway 
between Japan and the special region, nor who is responsible for it and 
with what purpose in mind. More curiously, the appearance of the gate 
is accepted as a fait accompli in Japan and the government quickly orders 
the deployment of the Self-Defence Forces without having done 
research to what the gate itself might be, how it might work, and if can 
be determined whether it would stay open or close or disappear after 
some time. The unquestioning attitude by all the characters towards the appearance and 
nature of the gate tells us it’s sole function is to start the narrative—not unlike an inversed deus 
ex machina—and is of no further consequence to the rest of the story at this point in the series. 
Both Penney and Mizuno have already noted how popular works can use fictional narratives 
that allow readers to imagine a ‘what-if’ scenario with the potential of questioning alternatives 
to social or political realities.80 Gate draws on the same possibilities of combining military 
affairs with fantasy to set up its main plot. 
There are several significant things to note about this plot at the outset. First, Gate does not 
mention anything with regards to the constitutional restrictions on the use of force by the 
                                                
79 Yanai Takumi, Gēto: Jieitai kano chi nite, kaku tatakaeri 1 (Tokyo: Alphapolis, 2012): pp. 20-21. 
80 Matthew Penney, “‘War Fantasy’ and Reality—‘War as Entertainment’ and Counter-narratives in Japanese 
Popular Culture,” p. 35; Hiromi Mizuno, “When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desires in Anime,” p. 105. 
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SDF. Japan’s military is deployed and allowed to use force if necessary to achieve its 
objectives. Second, Gate completely ignores the security alliance between Japan and the 
United States. The Japanese army members defending Ginza against the foreign aggressors 
coming from the gate were not assisted by their American allies. This is remarkable, since 
there are still many troops stationed in US bases on Japanese soil. In fact, Yokota Airbase, 
headquarters of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), and Camp Zama, headquarters of 
the United States Army in Japan (ASAJ) are both located no more than 50 kilometers away 
from central Tokyo.81 This means that Gate makes it clear at the outset that it presents a vision 
of Japan that is both autonomous in its defence and is not bound by any constitutional 
restrictions on the use of force when necessary. 
 
4.3. System: Great power politics and a scramble for the gate 
The appearance of the gate to another world in Japan not only allows for the deployment of 
the Self-Defence Forces abroad in combat situations, but also sets the stage on this side of the 
gate for a geostrategic struggle at the international level and political in-fighting at the 
national level. 
The United States publicly announces its support for the Japanese government in its 
deployment of the military beyond the gate. However, the US president laments the 
appearance of the gate in Japan and what he sees as the defensive and cautious approach of 
the Japanese government. In cowboy rhetoric mirroring that of George W. Bush, the fictional 
president Diller views the gate as a “frontier” that provides access to vast amounts of resources 
beyond. The US supplies Japan as an “ally” but demands a share of the loot (see fig. 3). 
                                                
81 http://www.usfj.mil/AboutUSFJ.aspx 
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Figure	  4	  
  
Although US involvement in the middle east inhibit the 
president to send in his own troops through the gate to secure 
access to the special region’s resources, he orders a unit of special 
forces to kidnap diplomatic envoys from the empire beyond the 
gate in order to have them “invite” US representation in the 
special region. When that fails, the US attempts to blackmail 
Japan’s new prime minister (who now resembles Shinzō Abe—
see fig. 4). 
 
The EU is also interested in the natural resources beyond the gate, but that vexes Russian 
leadership, who rely on their exports of oil and gas to Europe. The ficitonal prime minister 
Motoi even suspects Russia to fire a Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) at the gate 
to get rid of the EU’s potential alternate energy supplier (see fig. 5). 
The People’s Republic of China also has set its sights on the special region behind the gate. 
After relying on its promise of aflluence to legitimize its leadership to Chinese citizens, the 
Communist Party has become a massive importer of natural resources. However, the Prime 
Minister ponders, China is filled with inequality and corruption and Japan thus needs to 
respond very cautious to its approachment (see fig. 6). 
China is also one of many countries requesting that the gate be placed under international 
supervision. However, the Japanese prime minister questions the motives for this move. Most 
of these countries simply want a share in the resources found at the other side of the gate, he 
suspects, and they fear that Japan has sole access. The prime minister thus dismisses requests 
for multilateral supervision of the special region under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) as 
Figure	  5	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an “absurd request”. This would only be an excuse for the presence of foreign armies in the 
middle of Tokyo (see fig. 7). 
Thus, Gate constructs a system narrative that presents an zero-sum world of finite natural 
resources in which state leaders are mostly driven by their material self-interest, sparking a 
fierce scramble for resources. International organizations such as the UN and multilateral 
frameworks for collective action and security are dismissed as mere vehicles for great power 
interests and meddling in domestic affairs. These attitudes position Japan’s government and its 
armed forces centre stage in a tense geostrategic struggle between the great powers that all 
attempt to gain access to the vast amount of resources that lie beyond the gate in Japan’s 
capital. 
 
 
Figure	  6	  
Figure	  7	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Figure	  8	  
4.4. Issues: Hostile foreign forces and natural disasters 
The most obvious security threat that is presented in Gate is the invasion of a foreign power in 
the form of the army marching through the gate. This fantastical scenario aside, however, the 
manga also engages a range of other threats that resonate directly with issues that feature 
heavily in Japanese discourses on security. 
The gate connects Japan with the continent of Falmart on the 
other side. The extant political constellation on the continent 
consists of a range of kingdoms that are assimilated into and 
answer to a larger empire. The political structure, and especially 
the imagery used to graphically depict it, clearly connote the 
Roman Empire (see fig. 8). This is nothing new. For one, it 
coincides with a common trope in public relations strategies of 
the Japanese defence establishment. Frühstück explains how the 
manga series surrounding the SDF mascot Prince Pickles 
(Pikurusu ōji) also employs an “Evil Empire” as a means of 
explaining how, even in a peaceful country, a defensive military force is always necessary to 
deter malign foreign forces.82 The appearance of what looks like the Roman Empire also 
corresponds with manga genre conventions. Manga scholars Mio Bryce and Jason Davis 
explain how the fantasy genre in Japanese fiction—as elsewhere—draws heavily on mythology 
and folklore from a range of historical civilizations.83 However, choosing the Roman Empire, 
in particular, sets up the plot and narrative in a way that favours one of Yanai’s main 
messages. Confronting Japan with an enemy that resembles the ancient Romans creates a 
scenario in which the Japanese armed forces can challenge (successfully, due to the 
advancements in military technology) one of the most powerful empires in human history. 
The SDF are also confronted with natural disasters and humanitarian threats during their 
deployment in the special region. Most of this results from the re-awakening of a particularly 
powerful and ferocious fire-breathing dragon that coincides with the deployment of the SDF 
beyond the gate. The destruction that the dragon leaves in its wake drives many people from 
their homes and villages, causing large flows of refugees throughout the special region. At 
                                                
82 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, esp. pp. 128-135. 
Unlike Gate, this is one of the few manga series actually produced, designed, and funded by the Self-Defence 
Forces. However, as the name of the mascot suggests, Prince Pickles is mainly targeted towards explaining the 
role of the SDF to a younger audience. 
83 Mio Bryce and Jason Davis, “An Overview of Manga Genres,” in Manga: An Anthology of Global and Cultural 
Perspectives, edited by Toni Johnson-Woods (New York: Continuum, 2010): p. 35. 
MA Thesis Asian Studies  A.J.W. Wit, s1432508 
 28 
some point, the region also suffers from a severe earthquake. I will discuss the role of the SDF 
in response to these issues in the next sub-chapter. 
The most pressing security issues, however, are a direct result of the nature of world politics 
constructed in the manga. As each country is purely driven by material self-interest and 
pressured by domestic factors, they are willing to employ a range of means to exert their 
influence in international affairs. In the manga, the US, the PRC, and Russia are all engaging 
in hostile behaviour towards Japan to get access to the gate. As mentioned, Japan has to 
consider direct attacks on its territory through a potential SLBM by Russia, fend off covert 
special military operations by all three states, and engage in counter-intelligence. There is also 
the indirect threat of foreign military presence and interference in domestic affairs through a 
UN-mandated multinational force being deployed in Japan. Ironically, the clearest threat to 
Japan’s security emanates from its supposed security ally—the US. President Diller blackmails 
prime minister Motoi with sensitive information the US intelligence agency has intercepted 
regarding a corruption scandal that could blow up Motoi’s government (a clear reference to 
Abe’s resignation after his first time in office). He attempts to coerce the Japanese prime 
minister into aligning his policies with US interests. The imbalanced dynamics of the US-
Japan relation are not just made explicit through the sequence of events; they are also 
connoted by the more subtle use of language. The various official registers of politeness of 
speech in the Japanese language are sometimes hard to translate accurately, but the usage of 
these registers is an important signifier of interpersonal relations in Japanese comics. Whereas 
Prime Minister Motoi speaks in a formal register when addressing his American counterpart, 
President Diller replies to him in a casual and blunt manner, which is highly inappropriate 
and patronizing in this context (see fig. 9). 
   
  Figure	  9	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Thus, despite the SDF engaging in being presented by a range of threats, the key one 
emanates from hostile behavior by other political actors. Since the main source of 
humanitarian concern in the special region is a fire-breathing dragon, this sets up the plot in 
the advantage of a ‘normal combat military’, as the root cause of the humanitarian threats can 
only be taken away by slaying the dragon (Itami eventually manages to do so in volume 7). In 
other words, this scenario again pits the Japanese military against a mighty adversary, which it 
is only able to succesfully counter through the use of force and sophisticated military 
equipment. 
 
4.5. Identity: Individual members of the military that defend the public 
Gate takes a significantly more nuanced view on the organization of the SDF, their missions 
and sphere of activities, and the individuals that make up its ranks than it does on the nature 
and organization of world politics. In particular, it highlights the variety of the activities 
Japan’s armed forces engage in and the divergent views and characters of its members. 
However, the manga indicates a clear preference over the primary and secondary functions of 
the military. 
 
4.5.1. Missions and activities of the Self-Defence Forces 
Allow me to reiterate the primary missions of Japan’s armed forces in Gate. The government 
deployed the SDF to investigate the special region, arrest the ones responsible for the invasion 
of Japanese territory, and to secure compensation for the incident. Upon moving through the 
gate, however, the military encounters another hostile army. After a resounding victory due to 
their incomparably superior weaponry (infantry and cavallery are no match for armoured 
vehicles and heavy artillery), the SDF establishes an organized and well-defended perimeter 
around the gate. The area is referred to as Arnus Hill (Arunusu no oka) and becomes the main 
base of Japan’s military presence in the special region.  
Itami is sent out from the main base to scout the region as squad leader of one the army’s 
reconnaissance units. His main objectives are to gather information and win over the “hearts 
and minds” of the local population (mirroring rhetoric from the US when its armed forces—
and those of Japan—were deployed in Iraq). Itami’s squadron quickly runs into refugees 
fleeing from the rampaging dragon, and his unit assist some of these refugees in their 
migration to safety elsewhere. Upon encountering the dragon themselves, they engage the 
beast in order to protect the people—and are able to damage the dragon considerably, to the 
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Figure	  10	  
amazement of the local inhabitants. Itami’s unit (initially against the wishes of his superiors) 
decides to bring back some of the refugees to host them within the main base, where the 
armed forces then soon create a refugee camp for other displaced people (see fig. 10). 
These initial missions set the stage 
for a recurring pattern throughout the 
series. Wherever Itami and his squad 
go, they establish friendly relations 
with the locals and attempt to set up 
diplomatic channels through which 
Japan’s military and envoys from the 
Military of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
attempt to seek compensation and 
justice for Japan’s victims. In the mean 
time, they continue to scout, build, 
trade, offer medical assistance, learn more about (and respect) local languages and customs, 
and perform more mundane tasks such as filing paperwork. However, Itami and his troops 
are often forced into scenarios in which they have to engage in military combat to keep them 
safe (see fig. 11). This distinguishes Gate significantly from earlier works of popular culture that 
considers the implications of the restrictions on the use of force by the armed forces for their 
(in-)ability to defend themselves and others when deployed abroad. A good example of this is 
Oshii Mamoru’s animated film Kidō keisatsu patoreibā the movie 2 (Patlabor 2: The Movie, 1993). In 
a critical response to the SDF’s first deployment on a UNPKO in Cambodia, Patlabor 2 opens 
with a Japanese unit under attack somewhere in Southeast Asia, unable to defend itself and 
suffering heavy casualties. As mentioned earlier, instead of challenging the constitutional 
restrictions on force, Gate ignores Article 9 completely, and allows the reader to envision a 
Japanese military able to defend itself and others when necessary through military combat. 
    
   Figure	  11	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In fact, the ability to fall back on military combat and the use of force is a key condition for 
the military to live up to its primary role: the defence of the people. A good illustration of this 
distribution of priorities is the occasion of a strong earthquake in volumes 4 and 5 of the series. 
When warning signs of a major earthquake are detected, the army does not hesitate for a 
single moment and quickly sets in motion an early warning plan to prepare the citizens of 
Falmart’s capital. Since the content of this part of Gate was written in between 2004 and 2010 
and the major earthquake and tsunami of 2011 had not taken place yet, this event can be read 
as a critique of the army’s initial slow response to the Kōbe earthquake in 1995. However, 
Gate does not elaborate on the advanced disaster relief capabilities and experiences the SDF 
has increasingly accumulated, both domestically and abroad. Instead, this scenario is quickly 
steered into a plotline in which Itami and his group discover that Japanese citizens have been 
secretly abducted through the gate and enslaved in the special region by hawkish factions 
within the empire. This development mirrors the North Korean abduction cases, and in a 
reflection of the importance prime minister Abe placed on this issue, one of the surviving 
kidnapped citizens in Gate is rescued with brute force. This event is also one of the rare 
occasions when the normally tolerant and kind-hearted Itami loses himself into a wrathful 
frenzy. Both as an act of retaliation, and to strongly convince the empire not to aggravate the 
Japanese nation any further and accept the conditions for a peace treaty, fighter jets of the Air 
Self-Defence Forces (ASDF) then bomb Falmart’s imperial senate (at night, without making 
casualties). This seemingly contradictory and overly hostile plot development undergirds Gate’s 
insistance on the importance placed above all else for the military to protect Japanese citizens. 
 
4.5.2. Capabilities and equipment of the Self-Defence Forces 
A key prerequisite for the fulfilment of the SDF’s primary role to safeguard Japan’s citizens in 
Gate’s narrative is the military’s sophisticated weaponry. It has enabled the SDF to repel the 
invaders from Tokyo and defeat the imperial army, empowered Itami and his squad to 
protect the refugees from (and later kill) the dragon, allowed for the successful rescue of its 
kidnapped citizens, and successfully deterred many hawkish senators from challenging Japan 
again. Sophisticated weaponry also safeguards people since less lives are lost when Japanese 
troops actually have to engage in combat. Gate envisions a military in which hardly any 
Japanese soldiers lose their lives due to their overwelming technological advantage. 
The manga’s insistence on the merit of sophisticated hardware is also supported by the 
aestheticization of military equipment and weaponry. The amount of painstaking detail 
invested in the accurate graphic representation and the amount of frames dedicated to the 
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display of the SDF’s military hardware is quickly noticeable (see fig. 12). However, it is 
important to note that part of this is simply consistent with audience expectations and genre 
conventions of the manga, and need not necessarily indicate a clear political statement. 
Penney reminds us that “technological details bordering on the fetishistic” and “selling ‘war as 
entertainment’ to members of Japan’s military fan subculture” is a key part of the military 
fantasy genre.84 However, in the case of Gate there is overwhelming textual evidence to 
support a reading of the manga as strongly favouring a stronger military that is allowed to use 
its advanced weaponry to actively deter and, when needed, do battle with hostile forces. 
 
Figure	  12	  
In fact, the manga implies that the humanitarian character and role that seems to 
constitute the secondary role of the SDF directly flows from the Japanese troops having the 
strength to deter and repel its enemies. Only when that condition is met can they effectively 
guarantee people’s safety. In also enables the manga to highlight the controlled and 
professional character of the members of Japan’s armed forces. Their training and Japan’s 
long-standing pacifistic stance has equipped them—perhaps more than other nations, the 
manga clearly implies—to handle a mandate to use force with great caution and 
responsibility, and allows them to contribute to peace and safety more actively and effectively. 
 
4.5.3. Individual soldiers with diverging views and personalities 
An important part of what Gate conveys to its readers deals with the character and roles of 
the SDF’s service members. This resonates with Frühstück’s studies on Japan’s armed forces. 
An important part of her work examined how the uneasy status of the military impacts the 
professional self-perception of Japanese soldiers. She finds that many members of the SDF 
find it hard to balance between their military training for war on the one hand, and their 
exclusive experience of being deployed on non-combat missions in which the exercise of 
                                                
84 Matthew Penney, “‘War Fantasy’ and Reality—‘War as Entertainment’ and Counter-narratives in Japanese 
Popular Culture,” p. 35. 
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violence is strictly prohibited. She describes how soldiers deal with this unease in different 
ways. She argues that some “service members share the desire to be associated with the more 
conventional military side of the Self-Defence Forces—its powerful technology, its associations 
with the U.S. military, and its potential for making war.”85 However, Frühstück stresses that 
other Japanese soldiers share with the majority of the Japanese public an unwillingness to buy 
into the supposed valid equation between the state and the legitimate use of military violence. 
Instead, she describes how the self-perception of soldiers such as these “has more in common 
with the (military) hero of a forest fire than with the soldier of conventional modern nation-to-
nation warfare. Neither aspires to kill or die for the nation,” she finds, “even though both 
might risk their lives.”86 
This ambivalent position towards the self-perception and professional identity of members 
of the Self-Defence Forces is also reflected in Gate. In particular, it is represented in a personal 
clash between Itami and another important character in the series, first lieutenant Yanagida 
Akira. The two characters, despite the sense of duty they both share, hold very different ideas 
about how to represent the interests of the Japanese government and public best in the special 
region, and they clash on numerous occasions. 
    
	   	   	   Figure	  13	  
Yanagida (who strikingly resembles Kobayashi Yoshinori’s cartoonist self-representation—see 
fig. 13) is one of the most Machiavellian characters in the manga. He continuously attempts to 
persuade Itami to start mapping the resources for Japan’s benefit in his squadron’s 
reconnaissance missions, but Itami refuses. In volume 5, Yanagida proposes to Itami to hunt 
down and get rid of the dragon. This idea catches Itami’s interest, as he and his troops have 
seen the destruction and suffering that the dragon left in its wake. However, when Yanagida 
hints that hunting down the dragon would conveniently legitimate the military’s presence in a 
region that is filled with oil, Itami reacts furiously, questioning Yanagida’s motives for risking 
                                                
85 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, p. 186. 
86 Ibid., p. 184. 
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Figure	  14	  
the lives of his squad members just to get access to natural resources. However, the calculating 
Yanagida already knows that Itami will still push ahead with the mission in order to save 
people. Instead of risking his squad, however, Itami goes alone and joins a small band of locals 
whose homeland the dragon has made its nest. Again, the use of military weaponry—in this 
case rocket launchers and carefully planted explosives—lead the way to victory. 
Besides re-emphasizing how advanced weaponry leads to victory and saves lives, this 
plotline allows Gate to illustrate the diversity of views of the individual SDF members and 
their sense of duty and self-sacrifice. Itami’s desire to protect other people conflicts with the 
responsibility he feels towards his squad members, and he does not make decisions lightly with 
regards to their lives and well-being. His moral dilemma makes him ponder on the various 
individuals that make up his squadron and their personalities, interests, and ambitions (see fig. 
14). In fact, the attention Gate spends on giving the many individual service members that are 
deployed in the special region their own unique character traits and personalities—both 
graphically and in speech—rivals the level of detail spent on the portrayal of military 
hardware. It is no wonder Yanai’s light 
novels and manga also found an avid 
readership amongst SDF personnel, 
according to the website of the TPCO. 
Members of the SDF said they were 
amazed by the realism with which 
equipment and operations of the armed 
forces were displayed in the series, but 
they also appreciated the relatability of the 
characters and situations. 87  This is not 
surprising, given Yanai’s service in the 
armed forces himself. Gate thus strongly 
suggests to his audiences that the armed 
forces, in the end, simply consist of 
indivuals doing their job and taking pride in  
what they do—protecting people. 
 
                                                
87 Japan Self-Defence Force Tokyo Provincial Cooperation Office, “Wadaibuttōchū! Terebi anime “gēto” to kiseki no 
korabo [Wonderful collaboration with tv anime Gate],” accessed online 5 July 2016, http://www.mod. 
go.jp/pco/tokyo/tokusetu/tokusetu.html#. 
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A final note on the personality of the service members of Japan’s armed forces in Gate I 
want to make concerns the character and interests of Itami himself. As a self-proclaimed otaku, 
Itami is often looked down upon by his team members and other members of the SDF. This is 
facilitated by his tolerant personality and easy-going 
demeanor. He and Kurata Takeo, a sergeant first class in 
Itami’s squad, discuss their preferences for specific 
elements of moe. While Kurata is a fan of cat ears, Itami 
favours gothic lolitas. The fantasy universe of Gate present 
various elements of moe in the races that inhabit the 
continent of Falmart, and Kurata and Itami at times 
rejoice in discovering inhabitants that display elements of 
moe they like (see fig. 15). Despite Itami’s interest in otaku 
culture and his slacking attitude, however, the reader 
discovers throughout the series that Itami is highly skilfull 
Figure	  15 and professional. It turns out he has even successfully 
 passed the rigorous ranger training—to the surprise of 
some of his unsuspecting squad members. This all seems to suggest that Yanai is aware of the 
discussions surrounding otaku subculture in Japan and its troubled relationship with broader 
society. Gate rejects Azuma’s view that otaku are mere postmodern “database animals” and 
stresses that they, too, can both enjoy moe and partake in the grand narrative of state security 
by serving in the military forces to defend the Japanese public. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1. Visions of a ‘normal’ country 
Through its fictional narrative, Gate constructs an alternative future for Japanese security 
policies and the role of its armed forces. By drawing on manga’s potential to construct 
imaginary worlds for its readers, Gate allows for a thought experiment. It ignores Article 9 of 
the Japanese constitution, allowing Japan to deploy its military abroad without constitutional 
restrictions on the use of force. It also ignores Japan’s security treaty with the United States, 
granting Japan autonomy in its own defence. In other words, it presents what the Self-Defence 
Forces could be: a normal military. 
This means that Gate clearly resonates with the narrative envisioning a ‘normal’ combat 
military in Japanese security discourse. Although the Self-Defence Forces are represented as 
engaging in a wide variety of activities, ranging from humanitarian assistance to filing 
paperwork, these moments are sparse. Instead, the plot outline and narrative of the manga 
convey that Gate favours a strongly equipped military that can effectively deter hostile forces 
and is allowed to use force when necessary to defend its territory and people. The manga is 
particularly critical of the security alliance with the United States and multilateral action 
through international organizations such as the United Nations. This severely undermines 
Japan’s current security position and also challenges Abe’s new security legislations and its 
envisioned ‘collective self-defence’ so as to allow the Self-Defence Forces to come to the aid of 
the United States when it is under attack. 
However, Gate’s messages are conflicted. On the one hand, it needs to leave out the US 
military presence on Japanese soil to facilitate a vision of Japan that is autonomous in its 
defence. On the other hand, however, it still presents the Japanese prime minister as being 
coerced into aligning his policies with US interests to demonstrate the unequal relationship 
between the two countries. The same is true for its relationship between violence and safety. 
Gate is highly mistrustful of great power politics and wants to safeguard its territory and 
people, but proposes to arms itself with advanced military equipment and the means to use 
force in order to achieve this aim—resulting in the classic realist security dilemma. 
 
5.2. Opening up and closing off imaginations 
I argue that this is not Gate’s main message, however. Its portrayal of world politics and 
possible security threats is less sophisticated than the manga’s depiction of the varied 
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individuals who make up the members of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces. I thus read Yanai’s 
work mainly as a response the continued ambivalence and ambiguous standing of Japan’s 
armed forces and the implications this has for the professional self-perception of its members 
that Frühstück so accurately captures in her work. Gate is thus more about identity than 
system or issues. 
Gate can instead be read as opening up space for his readers to imagine the daily lives of 
people working (and risking their lives) for the Japanese public. Through his representation of 
individual service members, he invites his audience to consider their different personalities 
and even divergent self-perceptions as soldiers. He challenges Azuma’s claim that otaku cannot 
partake in grand narratives of the state and also opens up space for both the continuing social 
acceptance of otaku subculture as well as its return into a broader nationalist narrative.  
It is ironic that Gate—in its attempt for societal acknowledgement—closes off the 
imaginings of the SDF that have recently earned it more widespread recognition, namely its 
disaster relief and reconstruction activities after the eartquake and tsunami in 2011. Thus, 
despite the claim by Frühstück and Berger that many spheres of activities and roles similar to 
Japan’s armed forces are increasingly being adopted by military establishments across the 
world, Gate conveys the continued ambivalent feelings of the SDF’s service members towards 
their unclear status. Yanai leans towards positioning himself in the ‘normal combat military’ 
narrative and thus closes off imaginings of Japan’s armed forces in roles more oriented 
towards advanced disaster relief capabilities. To repeat Fisher in paraphrasing Jameson and 
Žižek, it is easier to imagine an imaginary fantasy world than it is to imagine the end of the 
‘normal’ military. 
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